Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2010

Donna Whitney v. Division of Juvenile Justice
Services; Utah Department of Human Services;
State of Utah; Quest Youth Services; Kyle
Lancaster; Dan Maldonado; Jason Kaufusi; Henry
Kaufusi; Huy Nguyen; and Barry Howard : Reply
Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Bridget K. Romano; assistant attorney general; Mark L. Shurtleff; attorney general; attorneys for
appellants.
Robert D. Strieper; attorney for appellee.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Whitney v. Juvenile Justice, No. 20100983 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2010).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/2647

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
Donna Whitney, Individual and as
parent of and heir of Dillon
Whitney, deceased,
Plaintiff/ Appellee
REPLY BRIEF OF THE
APPELLEE

v.
Division of Juvenile Justice
Services; Utah Department of
Human Services; State of Utah;
Quest Youth Services; Kyle
Lancaster; Dan Maldonado; Jason
Kaufusi; Henry Kaufusi; Huy
Nguyen; and Barry Howard,

Case No. 20100983-SC

Defendants/Appe] lants

REPLY BRIEF OF THE APPELLEE
CERTIFICATION OF QUESTION OF STATE LAW TO THE UTAH
SUPREME COT3RT BY THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
BRIDGET K. ROMANO (6979)
Assj^tant Utah Attorney General
MJARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666)
/Ijtah Attorney General
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
P.O. Box 140856
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0856
Telephone: (801) 366-0100

ROBERT D STRIEPER (10145)
STRIEPER LAW FIRM
2366 Logan Way
Salt Lake City, UT 84108
Telephone (801) 631-6421
Facsimile (801) 416-3616
Attorney for the Appellee

Oral Argument Requested and Published Decision Requested
FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
Donna Whitney, Individual and as
parent of and heir of Dillon
Whitney, deceased,
Plaintiff/ Appellee
REPLY BRIEF OF THE
APPELLEE

v.
Division of Juvenile Justice
Services; Utah Department of
Human Services; State of Utah;
Quest Youth Services; Kyle
Lancaster; Dan Maldonado; Jason
Kaufusi; Henry Kaufusi; Huy
Nguyen; and Barry Howard,

Case No. 20100983-SC

Defendants/Appellants

REF'LY BRIEF OF THE APPELLEE
CERTIFICATION 0 F QUESTION OF STATE LAW TO THE UTAH
SUPREME COUT^T B Y THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
BRIDG^T R R 0 M A N 0 ( 6979 )
M / otant Utah Attorney General
j ARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666)
Jtah Attorney General
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
P.O. Box 140856
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0856
Telephone: (801) 366-0100

ROBERT D STRIEPER (10145)
STRIEPER LAW FIRM
2366 Logan Way
Salt Lake City, UT 84108
Telephone (801) 631-6421
Facsimile (801) 416-3616
Attorney for the Appellee

Oral Argument Requested and Published Decision Requested

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

ARGUMENT

1

CONCLUSION

6

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. §63G-7-301 et. seq.(2007)

1

ORDINANCES
Salt Lake City, Ord 11.44.070(2011)

4, 5

CASES
Emery v. State, 483 P.2d 1296, 1297 (Utah 1971)
Little v. Utah State ljiiv. Family Servs. 667 P.2d 49, (Utah 1983)
Madsen v. State, ^ g 3 P 2 d
Pace v. St. Gojorge

City

92>

PoUce

92 (Utah 1978)
Dept

153

p 3d

789

FN2
4
2,3

(Utah 2006)

State v Germonto, 2003 UT App. 217, 73 P.3d 97 (Utah App 2003)
••••

1

1,2

ARGUMENT
Utah should not cast out thirty years of precedent by removing the
requirement that an incarcerated person needs to be within distinct
boundaries

to be considered incarcerated

in

a place of legal

confinement. The court assumes that "the legislature uses each term
[in a statute] advisedly and gives effect to each term according to its
accepted meaning." See Pace v. St. George City Police Dept. 2006 UT
App. 496, TJ6, 153 P.3d 789 (finding a person under arrest, restrained
and escorted to a restroom in the police station was under police
control) and State v. Germonto, 2003 UT App. gl7, If 7, 73 P.3d 978.
(Finding a prisoner who had not left the confines of v h p ™ i s °n could not
be convicted of escape).
The Immunity Act retains the State's sovereign imnf111111^
suit when an injury "arises out of, in connection with, or results
. the incarceration of any persons in any

trom

lr^m"

. . . place of lega^

confinement." Utah Code Ann. 63G-7-301(5)(j)(emphasis added). The
plain language of this section requires that an incarcerated person
would necessarily need to be "in" a "place of legal confinement" at the
1

time the negligence arises from which the government tries to assert its
immunity. Id.
In each and every case the touchstones of the incarcerate
exception have been applied to a person 1) restrained to a definitive
location with distinct boundaries and 2) under the control of the state.
See Madsen

v. State,

583 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1978)(finding the

incarceration exception applied to a person "m prison and under the
control of the State"); and all of its progeny, (each finding that the
incarcerated person was in a distinct location and under state control,
as discussed more fully in Ms. Whitney Opening Brief pp 16-17).
The accepted meaning of legal confinement as defined by the Utah
Court of Appeals is

a

place with distinct boundaries. Germonto, 2003

UT App. 217, a t ^|io.

Central to the Germonto opinion was the

definition of j e g a i confinement. Id. The court determining; "any place
w

ere

a person is legally confined must necessarily be a place with

P .lysical barriers where the person is actually confined." Id at ^f 10.
In the present case, Dillon Whitney was in a community-based
placement without any boundaries and was provided with a bus pass so

2

that he could go anywhere he chose in or even out of the city.1 Dillon
was not confined within any distinct boundaries.

The State's entire

argument in its Opening Brief rests upon the idea that "a place of legal
confinement" does not have to have any boundaries.
Specifically, what the State asserted was that the "[Governmental
Immunity] Act does not require actual confinement. Instead, the State
is protected from injuries connected to legal confinement.'" (see Applt's
Opening Brief at p. 12). The State goes on to claim that the "touchstone
of incarceration is being 'under the control of the state' [misquoting
Madsen v. State by leaving off the preceding passage, 'in prison and:]
and unable to be released without some kind of permission." See Id at
p. 13, and Madsen, 583 P.2d at 93. Such a distinction

would lead to the

absurd rule that a person (meaning everyone) who is v 4 n d e r

tne

of the government (as is everyone), who is voluntary v

1

contro

m

The order placing Dillon Whitney in the community-based placemen^
had absolutely no restrictions on places Dillon could go. It only
restricted whom Dillon could visit; specifically he was not allowed to
have contact with Kaden Casey and Lorenzo Gallegos.
2
The incarceration exception does not differentiate whether the person
voluntarily committed himself or herself to the place of confinement or
if they were involuntarily committed. Emery v. State, 483 P.2d 1296,
1297 (Utah 1971). (Finding a patient who voluntarily committed herself
to a specific place, the state mental hospital was incarcerated).
3

community (as fits most everyone) would meet the description of a
person incarcerated in a place of legal confinement.
Prisoners, inmates, mentally ill persons, and/or incarcerated
persons are released into the community, not out of the community.
Additionally, the State's proposed rule would include everyone in the
community as everyone is under the control of the state to some degree.
For example, children in foster care are wards of the State and
therefore are under the control of the State and would be considered
incarcerated. This Court previously determined that a child in foster
care could sue the State for their negligent placement.

See Little v.

Division of Family Services, 677 P.2d 49, 50-52 (Utah 1983). (See
Applee's Brief, EquaJf Protection of the Laws Sec. and Open Court Sec,
pp 19-23). Furthermore, children who are subjected to curfew laws are
considered ijj^der the control of the State and would be considered
mcarcr

i;rated, as would their parents. In particular, see Salt Lake City,

Ordinance 11.44.070 (2011) that provides:
CURFEW FOR MINORS:
A. It is unlawful for any minor under sixteen (16) years of
age to remain or loiter on any of the sidewalks, streets,
alleys or public places in the city between eleven o'clock
(11:00) P.M. and five o'clock (5:00) A.M. the following
4

morning.
B. It is unlawful for any minor under eighteen (18) years of
age to remain or loiter on any of the sidewalks, streets,
alleys or public places in the city between one o'clock (1:00)
A.M. and five o'clock (5:00) A.M. the following morning.
C. It is unlawful for any parent, guardian or other person
having legal care and custody of any minor dealt with
respectively in subsections A and B of this section to
knowingly allow or permit any such minor to remain or
loiter on any of the sidewalks, streets, alleys or public places
in the city, within the times provided in subsections A and B,
respectively, of this section, except as provided in subsection
D of this section.
Further examples would include any adult who has a restraining
order placed against them, as they are again tinder the control of the
state and would be considered incarcerated.
frequently subject themselves to the control of the

Jpstanding citizens
state and

would be

considered incarcerated when: they get in a car t b ^ r e D y subjecting
themselves to the Motor Vehicle Act; they work and are s u b j p c t e ( * t o

tne

Tax Code; they obtain a license to practice a profession thus subje >c ^ m §
themselves to the control of the Division of Professional Licensing along
with the laws of the state. Most would take offense to learn that the
State considers them incarcerated.

5

Simply put, if the only requirement were that a person is "under
the control of the State" and the place of legal confinement does not
have distinct boundaries, it would be overly broad and include everyone.
The legislature could not intend that a person "in a place of legal
confinement" would include a child, like Dillon, to be considered
incarcerated when he had free run in and beyond the Salt Lake
community.
CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm the district court of Utah's holding that a
child in the community is not incarcerated. Ms. Whitney, therefore,
respectfully requests tfrat the Supreme Court of Utah find in her favor
by confirming thirty
Immunity Act doe s

not

years

of precedent and that the Governmental

apply to Dillon Whitney.

Respec; t f u l l y submitted this

18th day of July 2011.
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